Die Discussion Papers dienen einer möglichst schnellen Verbreitung von neueren Forschungsarbeiten des ZEW. Die Beiträge liegen in alleiniger Verantwortung der Autoren und stellen nicht notwendigerweise die Meinung des ZEW dar.
Introduction
In 2002, the Swiss voters will have to decide on two proposals for a premature phase-out of nuclear power in Switzerland, which currently accounts for 40% of the Swiss electricity production.
Both proposals foresee a reduction of the operating time of existing nuclear power plants as compared to business-as-usual (BAU). Under BAU the power plants are scheduled to be in operation for 50 up to 60 calendar years. The proposal "Strom ohne Atom" (SOA) postulates a maximum operating time of 30 year, whereas the proposal "Moratorium Plus" (MOP) restricts the operating time to 40 years. SOA is not only more restrictive with respect to the permissible operating time but also entails the massive promotion of non-competitive combined heat and power to substitute for nuclear power.
In this paper, we investigate the economic implications induced by the premature phase-out scenarios of nuclear power under SOA and MOP. The main insights from our analysis can be summarized as follows:
• SOA induces non-negligible adjustment costs for the Swiss economy with an annual loss of 200 CHF per year and household over the next 45 years. This amount may be interpreted as a required average willingness-to-pay for having the SOA proposal implemented.
• The negative repercussions of SOA get substantially attenuated in the MOP scenario. Not only the use of existing nuclear power capacities for additional ten years but also the unrestricted choice of non-nuclear replacement technologies cut down aggregate adjustment costs vis-à-vis SOA. Instead of the administered use of combined heat and power under SOA, cheaper combined cycle gas turbines will back up nuclear power in the MOP scenario. At the household level, average costs drop to 60 CHF/a.
• The premature phase-out of nuclear power increases Swiss CO 2 emissions, since fossil fuel power generation will be used more extensively than under BAU. To assure carbon neutrality with respect to BAU emission levels, carbon taxes of up to 45 CHF per ton of CO 2 must be imposed under SOA and MOP. The tax-induced distortions magnify the phase-out costs.
Annual losses per household over the next 45 years increase to 230 CHF for the case of SOA and 110 CHF for the case of MOP.
• Economy-wide employment losses of premature nuclear phase-out are negligible, since substitution effects in factor demand of sectoral production compensate negative output effects. Even for the case of carbon neutrality, where carbon taxes reduce labor productivity, recycling of tax revenues through cuts in labor costs nearly offset negative impacts on labor demand.
Our results are based on simulations with an intertemporal computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the Swiss economy. An important feature of this model is the incorporation of a bottom-up engineering-type representation of the electricity sector within an aggregate top-down description of the rest of the economy. This hybrid approach (see Böhringer 1996 and 1998 for the general methodology) accounts for discrete technological responses in the power sector that will be triggered by energy policy interference.
There are two previous studies which investigated the potential economic effects of SOA and MOP (Prognos 2000; Pfaffenberger and Gerdey 2001) . Both studies are based on bottom-up partial equilibrium models for the Swiss electricity sector. Hence, these studies only capture the direct effects of energy policy interference on the electricity sector and do not report indirect effects on indicators of the remaining economy. In addition, they do not account for forward-looking behavior of economic agents which may substantially flaw economic rationality of investment decisions in the context of long-term policy issues. A comparison of cost estimates reveals that the bottom-up studies might significantly underestimate the economy-wide costs of a premature phase-out since negative feed-back and spillover effects to other markets are neglected.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a non-technical summary of the model and its parameterization. Section 3 lays out the policy scenarios and the simulation results. Section 4 concludes.
Analytical Framework
Our model combines several features that are required for an appropriate quantitative simulation of the effects induced by exogenous energy policy measures:
• At the sectoral level, it incorporates sufficient detail on sector-specific differences in factor intensities, degrees of input substitutability and price elasticites of demand in order to trace back the structural change in production and consumption patterns induced by a policy shift.
• The Swiss tax system is represented in sufficient detail to capture initial tax distortions.
• Consumption and investment decisions are based on rational expectations of future prices (clairvoyance). This assures that the effects of policy interference on savings and investments are consistently taken into account.
• Capital is internationally mobile with the rates of return determined by an exogenous international interest rate.
• The production possibilities in the electricity sector are represented by the convex combinations of discrete technological options instead of top-down smooth constant-elasticityof substitution (CES) production functions usually employed within the CGE approach. The bottom-up description of technologies for the electricity sector, which is based on engineering data, provides a realistic picture of endogenous adjustment to policy measures that are, particularly, targeted to the electricity sector (as is the case for nuclear phase-out policies).
The following section provides a non-technical description of an intertemporal multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model designed for the analysis of energy policy interference in open economies. The detailed algebraic model formulation can be downloaded from www.ecoplan.ch/download/swiss_phase_out_app.pdf.
Basic Model Structure
The model contains a disaggregate representation of 38 industries, whereby the electricity sector is modeled in technological detail. To account for different pollutant and energy intensities as well as inter-fuel substitution possibilities across energy goods, the model identifies 6 energy goods: heavy oil, light oil, gasoline, diesel, gas and electricity. Furthermore, the model incorporates major electricity-intensive industries such as the textile industry or manufacturing of paper which are most susceptible to the effects of changes in electricity prices. Producer goods are directly demanded by government, investment and export. Producer goods for consumption are demanded only indirectly because the model distinguishes 13 aggregate consumption categories which are produced by combining the outputs of the 38 industries in fixed proportions. Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix summarize the classification of industry and consumer commodities.
Production
Competitive entrepreneurs minimize the cost of production and allocate investment across sectors in order to maximize the present value of firms. For each industry except for the electricity sector, an aggregate production function characterizes technology through transformation possibilities on the output side (between production for domestic and export markets) and substitution possibilities on the input side (between alternative combinations of inputs). On the output side, production is split between goods produced for the domestic market and goods produced for the export market subject to a constant elasticity of transformation. On the input side, nested separable CES functions describe the technological substitution possibilities in domestic production between capital, labor, energy and material inputs (including diesel and gasoline). At the top level, material inputs are used in fixed proportions, together with a CES aggregate of labor and an energy-capital composite. Within the latter energy-capital composite, energy and capital trade off at a constant elasticity of substitution. The energy aggregate, in turn, is produced with a CES technology using oil (heavy and light oil), gas and electricity as inputs.
Household Behavior
Consumers choose to allocate lifetime income across consumption in different time periods. In each period, the consumer faces the choice between current consumption (non-leisure consumption goods and leisure) and savings (future consumption). The pure rate of time preference determines the intertemporal allocation of consumption. We employ a separable intertemporal utility function where the intra-period utility from consumption is based on a nested CES function over leisure and nonleisure consumption commodities. Utility from different periods trade off at a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Factors
Primary factors of production are labor and capital. Labor supply is elastic. Capital and labor are inter-sectorally mobile in the home country, but only capital can move across domestic borders. Total labor endowment increases with labor force efficiency along a steady-state growth rate. Capital stocks evolve through geometric depreciation and new investment. In the small open economy framework, the rates of return on mobile capital are determined by the international interest rate. We assume perfectly competitive factor markets in which factor prices adjust so that supply equals demand.
Government Sector
The government distributes transfers and provides a public good (including public investment), which is produced with commodities purchased at market prices. Government expenditures are financed with tax revenues. The model incorporates the main features of the Swiss tax and social transfer system. The public budget is balanced on an intertemporal basis. Along the baseline growth path, public income and expenditures balance on a period-by-period basis. In the policy counterfactuals, the application of environmental taxes might result in a temporary public deficit, as the anticipation of future tax revenue permits public expenditure to exceed government income during the initial periods. In all simulations the present value of public expenditure equals the present value of tax revenues.
Investment and Savings
The level of savings is endogenously determined by households which maximize lifetime consumption over the time horizon. Firm owners choose investment in order to maximize the present value of the firm. Investors and households compete for current consumption such that in equilibrium the marginal utilities of savings (future consumption) and demand (current consumption) are equalized.
Foreign Trade
Following the proposition of Armington (1969) , domestic and foreign goods are distinguished by origin. This accommodates both imports and exports of the same commodity to reflect empirical evidence on the crosshauling of trade flows. Due to lack of more detailed data, domestic and imported varieties of the same good are aggregated with identical shares across all components of final and intermediate demand. Demand for imports stems from cost-minimizing producer behavior and utility maximization of households. On the export side, products destined for domestic and international markets are treated as imperfect substitutes, which trade off at a constant rate of substitution.
Switzerland is treated as small in relation to the world market. The small country assumption implies that changes in the level of Swiss exports and imports have no effect on its terms of tradeinternational prices are exogenously fixed in foreign currency, i.e. export demand and import supply functions are horizontal. International capital flows (borrowing and lending) are endogenous, subject to an intertemporal balance of payments constraint, i.e. there is no change in net indebtedness over the model horizon. The imposition of an intertemporally balanced trade account is linked to a variable exchange rate which reconciles the present value of domestic import and foreign export demands.
Parameterization of the Basic Model
As is customary in applied general equilibrium analysis, the model is based on economic transactions in a benchmark year, 1998 in our case. Benchmark data determines parameters of the functional forms from a given set of benchmark quantities, prices, and elasticities. We replace the aggregate input-output monetary values for energy supply and demand with physical energy flows supplemented by official energy prices for industry and households (for details, see Prognos 1996) .
Data on various tax payments and transfers are taken from the Swiss Statistical Yearbook 1998.
Consistency of the intertemporal model with steady-state growth implies an endogenous relationship between three parameters: the rate of time preference, the depreciation rate of capital, and the growth rate of labor in efficiency units. In our simulations, we assume an exogenous labor growth rate of 1.3% and a time preference rate (interest rate) of 2%, which yields a capital depreciation rate of 4%.
Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix summarize key elasticities.
Bottom-up Representation of Electricity Sector

Overview of Electricity Sector Sub-Module
The standard description of power generation options via nested CES functions is replaced with a discrete representation of technologies (Böhringer 1998) . Power producers have discrete choices with respect to alternative technologies and combine these base on capacity constraints in order to meet electricity demand in a cost-minimizing way. Swiss power generation in the base year is represented through eight technologies which cover the five nuclear power plants KKB I (Beznau I), KKB II (Beznau II), KKM (Mühleberg), KKG (Gösgen) and KKL (Leibstad), a representative hydro power technology, a representative combined heat and power (CHP) technology, and a conventional oil-fired power plant technology. Table 1 provides a summary of base-year technologies, incorporated in the electricity sub-module of our model, with the respective shares in total Swiss electricity production. As to replacement technologies, there are three different combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) technologies, one district heating technology (DH) and eight different CHP technologies that differ with respect to cost structure and potential production capacities.
Electricity is routed to consumers via three different types of grids: supraregional, regional, and local grids. The respective end customers face different distribution prices. As to regional and supraregional grids, a further price distinction is made between major customers and average customers. The total price for electricity is composed of uniform electricity generation prices and consumer-specific distribution prices. Furthermore, the model distinguishes between winter load and summer load. Each power generation technology is characterized by an annual load pattern. Figure 1 sketches the structure of the electricity sector as incorporated into the general equilibrium model. Technologies not only differ with respect to cost structure but also with respect to capacity bounds. 
Scenarios and Results
Scenarios
The One concern of the protagonists for the premature phase-out of nuclear power is that discarded domestic nuclear power will be replaced by additional electricity imports from abroad (which may stem to a larger extent from foreign nuclear power production). In this vein, the simulations of SOA and MOP assume "trade-neutrality" with respect to BAU. In concrete terms, we impose the BAU imports as an upper bound on the permissible inflows of electricity from abroad (see Table 5 ). The international electricity prices applying to long-term import and export obligations are set to 5.5
Cts./kWh, which reflects long-term marginal production costs in Europe for base load. In addition to these import restrictions, SOA postulates that replacement capacities for nuclear power must be based on CHP. In our simulations we adopt the recommendations of the energy policy advisory board to the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (see Prognos 1999) to subsidize non-competitive CHP to a level that prevents investment in CCGT technologies during the transition period until 2045.
The associated subsidies are covered by a sales tax on nuclear power, hydropower and imported electricity.
Without further regulation, the premature nuclear phase-out will increase Swiss carbon emissions over the next decades since carbon-free nuclear power will be replaced by electricity from either CHP or CCGT, both requiring fossil fuel inputs. Given the importance of anthropogenic carbon emissions in the context of national and international greenhouse gas abatement policies, we have defined two additional scenarios SOA-N and MOP-N, which assures CO 2 -neutrality as compared to BAU. In other words, the scenarios SOA-N and MOP-N are supplemented with an economy-wide carbon constraint such that CO 2 emissions do not exceed the BAU emission levels. When the carbon constraint becomes binding, the associated shadow price indicates the level of the carbon tax that must be levied to warrant CO 2 -neutrality. Revenues from carbon taxes are recycled in proportion to tax payments through per-capita transfers to households and through a reduction in payroll taxes of employees. Table 6 provides a short characterization of all scenarios simulated in the following section. 
Results
Macroeconomic Impacts Table 7 to Table 10 -0.15% -0.32% -0.56% -0.57% -0.55% -0.54% -0.53% -0.27% Domestic production -0.09% -0.20% -0.32% -0.34% -0.33% -0.33% -0.34% -0.21% Labor input -0.03% -0.12% -0.15% -0.16% -0.14% -0.13% -0.13% -0.07% Capital input -0.05% -0.14% -0.24% -0.35% -0.42% -0.45% -0.47% -0.34% Consumption -0.06% -0.15% -0.28% -0.33% -0.35% -0.36% -0.37% -0.15% Investments -0.87% -1.23% -1.65% -1.48% -1.29% -1.22% -1.18% -0.68% Energy use 0.18% 0.42% 2.86% 3.19% 3.52% 3.89% 3.77% -0.25% Electricity 0.25% -4.33% -8.65% -8.55% -8.02% -7.48% -7.10% -0.24% Fossil energy 0.16% 2.27% 7.44% 7.99% 8.29% 8.61% 8.14% -0.25% Real wage -0.10% -0.21% -0.32% -0.34% -0.33% -0.33% -0.34% -0.17% Real capital rate -0.11% -0.22% -0.33% -0.36% -0.34% -0.34% -0.35% -0.19% 0.05% 0.06% 0.05% -0.01% -0.06% -0.07% -0.08% -0.01% Domestic production 0.03% 0.04% 0.02% 0.02% 0.04% 0.01% 0.00% -0.03% Labor input 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% -0.01% -0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% Capital input 0.01% 0.03% 0.04% 0.03% 0.02% -0.01% -0.04% -0.08% Consumption -0.04% -0.05% -0.05% -0.07% -0.09% -0.09% -0.08% -0.02% Investment 0.29% 0.27% 0.17% 0.04% -0.04% -0.07% -0.17% 0.04% Energy use -0.01% 0.07% 0.28% 3.83% 8.63% 7.58% 7.92% -0.05% Electricity -0.01% 0.15% 0.60% -0.98% -1.36% -1.28% -0.23% -0.05% Fossil energy -0.01% 0.03% 0.15% 5.79% 12.76% 11.26% 11.19% -0.05% Real wage 0.02% 0.02% 0.01% -0.02% -0.02% -0.03% -0.04% 0.00% Real capital rate 0.01% 0.00% -0.01% -0.04% -0.04% -0.05% -0.06% -0.02% -0.07% -0.21% -0.35% -0.48% -0.54% -0.57% -0.57% -0.37% Consumption -0.03% -0.15% -0.30% -0.37% -0.40% -0.43% -0.44% -0.17% Investment -1.49% -1.93% -2.37% -2.19% -1.96% -1.80% -1.66% -1.06% Energy use 0.19% -1.10% -1.09% -1.32% -1.27% -0.97% -0.58% -0.27% Electricity 0.25% -4.90% -8.66% -9.10% -9.10% -8.81% -7.95% -0.26% Fossil energy 0.17% 0.39% 1.93% 1.86% 1.97% 2.29% 2.38% -0.27% Real wage -0.13% -0.27% -0.34% -0.38% -0.38% -0.39% -0.38% -0.23% Real capital rate -0.12% -0.26% -0.33% -0.37% -0.38% -0.38% -0.37% -0.23% 0.00% 0.05% 0.24% -0.03% -0.86% -0.65% -0.10% -0.12% Electricity 0.00% 0.13% 0.55% -2.69% -5.10% -5.03% -4.08% -0.11% Fossil energy -0.01% 0.02% 0.12% 1.05% 0.90% 1.17% 1.49% -0.12% Real wage -0.02% -0.04% -0.07% -0.12% -0.14% -0.16% -0.15% -0.08% Real capital rate -0.02% -0.03% -0.07% -0.12% -0.14% -0.16% -0.15% -0.08%
We start interpretation of results for scenarios SOA and MOP, which do not impose CO2-neutrality. GDP -as a key indicator of economic performance drops to 0.57 % under SOA (0.08 % for MOP) during the transition period and remains 0.27% (0.01% in the case of MOP) below BAU levels in the long-run. The premature nuclear phase-out implies a loss of productive resources, i.e. the use of existing nuclear capacities for electricity generation. Earlier investment in replacement technologies leads to a rise in electricity prices that increase production costs with negative impacts on electricity demand and sectoral output during the adjustment period. In the long run, consumption and investment grow from a slightly smaller level. Clearly, the magnitude of these effects is determined by the effective reduction of nuclear power generation as compared to BAU. The shorter the permissible operation time of power plants vis-à-vis BAU is, the higher the induced negative adjustment effects are. Table 8 indicates that the economy-wide impacts of MOP are insignificant, whereas SOA induces non-negligible adjustment costs. Only a share of the cost differences is attributable to the difference in calendar year reduction. The main reason for the substantially higher adjustment costs under SOA as compared to MOP is the administered use of rather expensive CHP until 2045 to back up nuclear capacities, whereas under MOP, rather cheap combined cycle-gas turbines (CCGT) can be used. The implied cost-differences are reflected in the magnitude of electricity price increases and the associated declines in electricity demand (see Figure 2 and 3). Under SOA, the transitional increase in electricity price is much higher than under MOP, causing a larger decline in electricity demand. Fossil fuel use in both scenarios rises as compared to BAU because nuclear power is replaced by gas powered CCGT or CHP. The increase in fuel demand under SOA is lower than under MOP because of lower overall electricity demand. In the long run, the structure of power production under SOA and MOP nearly coincides with BAU because the runtime restrictions for nuclear power plants become obsolete and the same power plant replacement options become available. In all four scenarios, employment losses are negligible. Significant repercussions on labor demand which could have been triggered by carbon taxes are to a larger extent offset by revenueneutral cuts in labor costs. Negative impacts on labor demand, due to the decline in production, are compensated by factor substitution effects as labor becomes relatively cheaper compared to capital inputs.
Welfare
The welfare implications of the phase-out scenarios can be measured in terms of Hicksian equivalent variation in lifetime income (HEV). For example, a HEV of minus 1 % indicates a loss in lifetime income of 1% as compared to the BAU. For the sake of transparency, we have converted the HEV for the four policy counterfactuals into equivalent annual costs per average Swiss household over the transition period between 2000-2045 (see Table 11 ). This number indicates how many CHF per year the household foregoes due to the respective phase-out scenario. It can be interpreted as the required average willingness-to-pay of a Swiss citizen to see the respective proposals in place. The long-term impacts of a premature nuclear phase-out on sectoral production are negligible; in all four scenarios the long-term deviations from BAU levels are less than 0.5%. An accelerated phaseout induces some structural change during the transition period but in the long run SOA and MOP are no longer constrained vis-à-vis BAU which explains the very similar long-term structure. Only under SOA and SOA-N with their substantial increase in electricity prices, do electricity-intensive sectors such as textiles or paper face a significant decline in output due to the increase of production cost during the transition period. Figure 4 illustrates the impacts of SOA on production in selected electricity-intensive sectors (under SOA-N the effects are only slightly higher, since increased energy costs in these sectors are more or less offset by cutbacks in labor costs). In line with the electricity price changes, the production in textile and wood drops by more than 4% in 2015 but recovers during the adjustment process to catch up with BAU levels in the long run.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have investigated the economic implications of a premature nuclear phase-out in We have not accounted for the external costs of nuclear power in our calculations due to the large uncertainties in the valuation of nuclear risks. Therefore, the adjustment costs presented in our analysis
can not be interpreted as simple excess costs of energy policy interference, but must be viewed as the price tag for the risk reduction from nuclear power operation given additional constraints (preferences) on back-up technologies and carbon neutrality. 
